Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Difference and Repetition', 'Classes and Attributes' and 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3123 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
21901 'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3125 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
21908 Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
21902 'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
21903 Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
21904 Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9783 While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
3106 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
3113 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3108 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
3110 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
3124 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
3119 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]